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‘Grassroots Conservatism in Post-War Britain: A View from the Bottom-
Up’ 
 




It is well known the membership of British Conservative Party in the 1950s 
dwarfed that of other parties but there has been very little examination of the 
grassroots of the Conservative Party in this crucial period when membership 
peaked. What literature there is on local Conservatives comes predominantly 
from the top-down focus of national politics and revolves around four disputed 
images of the local party. First, high-levels of membership are associated with 
commendable engagement with formal politics. Second, local associations are 
presented as inconsequential but autonomous. Third local activists are presented 
as uninterested in ideology and solely focused on campaigning and social 
activity. Finally, associations are presented as dominated by women precisely 
because of their primarily social nature. This article examines the debates about 
these conventional images through an analysis of the rival Conservative factions 
in two Newcastle-upon-Tyne Associations, the location of probably the most 
divisive splits in Twentieth Century Conservatism. It suggests that debates about 
a ‘golden age’ of activism are unhelpful in understanding mass participation, 
that the conventional conception of autonomy obscures informal relationships, 
that attention to the ideological dimension is central to understanding and that 
the nature of female participation can only be understood by challenging the 
false dichotomy of social and political motivations. Taken together it argues that 
the study of grassroots Conservatism needs to grapple with the meanings, 
 
  
motivations and practices as seen from below as well as the consequences of 
such activity for those above. In this way the study of politics from the bottom-







The vast grassroots political organizations of 1950s Britain can appear to be 
from a different world when compared with those of today. Taken together the 
major parties reached a membership peak of over four million, more than three 
million of them Conservative. This period of mass participation was central to 
the activity of the parties themselves and has fascinated political scientists. 
Furthermore, recent trends in political history have stressed the general 
importance of local politics and activism. Viewing past politics from a 
grassroots perspective does more than simply add detail to existing national 
accounts: it can both challenge conventional stereotypes and lead to revisions of 
the categories on which traditional top-down accounts rest.1 The intensive 
interest in bottom-up studies of politics in other organizations is not, however, 
found in the study of the Conservative Party. 
 
 
1 See for examples E.P. Thompson, “Homage to Tom Maguire” in Essays in Labour History ed. 
Asa Briggs and John Saville (London, 1960); David Howell, British Workers and the 
Independent Labour Party 1888-1906 (Manchester, 1983); Duncan Tanner, Political Change 
and the Labour Party 1900-1918 (Cambridge, 1990).  
 
  
This article provides an account of the nature of political activity in the post-
1945 Conservative Party from the bottom-up through the lens of Newcastle, the 
location of the most fractious of constituency Conservative Associations in this 
period. The analysis of conflict in the study of grassroots politics is important 
because in day-to-day activity, particularly in a Conservative Party that 
emphasised pragmatism, values are often not discussed. During disputes, 
however, assumptions (both shared and contested), are explicitly articulated. 
The rivalry that exists during dispute also generates considerable evidence about 
the day-to-day life of political parties, where the paucity of sources is otherwise 
a considerable problem.  
 
The article begins by identifying four top-down images of grassroots 
Conservatism relating to levels of engagement; the formal autonomy of 
Associations; the apolitical nature of activity and the central but passive place of 
women within Conservative organizations. It then describes the context of 
Newcastle Conservative politics and the linked disputes in two Newcastle 
Conservative Associations. The first, in North Newcastle, is a prime candidate 
for the most divisive Association split in the twentieth century.2 The second, 
related, split in Newcastle West saw the most prominent Conservative women 
 
2 This dispute is often mentioned, frequently with considerable inaccuracies see for examples 
Robert McKenzie, British Political Parties: The distribution of power within Conservative and 
Labour parties (London, 1964 [1955]), 242 and Austin Ranney, Pathways to Parliament 
(London, 1965), 48–49. Stuart Ball provides a much better main account of the conflict in 
providing a context for the Cuthbert Headlam diaries although naturally the focus is firmly on 
Headlam rather than the Association, see Stuart Ball (ed), Parliament and Politics in the Age of 
Churchill and Attlee: The Headlam Diaries, 1935–1951 (Cambridge, 1999), 30–37. (All 
subsequent references to the Headlam diaries are taken from this volume). 
 
  
break from the rest of the Association over their right to organize themselves. 
The article then analyses these disputes using insights from them disputes to test 
the adequacy of the conventional images of grassroots Conservatism, 
concluding that revisions are necessary to each of the components that constitute 
the top-down view of the constituency Conservative Association.  
 
Images of Local Conservatism 
 
There has been a longstanding interest in the relationship between the post-war 
Conservative Party and the public. Much of this literature, aiming to understand 
the party’s electoral success, presents popular support as a passive reflection of 
social structure although a minority does engage with the activity which created 
and constituted the Conservative vote.3 Recently, this interest has been extended 
to the cultural aspects of party organization, most notably in Lawrence Black’s 
recent reconstruction of the ‘party political’ but only ‘partly political’ post-war 
Young Conservatives.4 The project of recovering the culture and ideology of 
popular Conservatism has not, however, addressed the core of the party’s 
organization, its associations and membership in the post-war period.  
 
 
3 For an example of the later in the argument electoral recovery post-1945 was actively forged 
the connection of policy positions with popular disaffection with austerity and rationing see Ina 
Zweiniger-Bargielowska, ‘Rationing, Austerity and the Conservative Party Recovery after 
1945’, Historical Journal, 37:1 (1994): 173-97. For an overview see Martin Pugh, ‘Popular 
Conservatism in Britain: Continuity and Change 1880-1987’, Journal of British Studies, 27:3 
(1988): 254-82. 
4 Lawrence Black, ‘The Lost World of Young Conservatism’, Historical Journal, 51:4 (2008): 
993; Lawrence Black, Redefining British Politics: culture, consumption and participation, 1954-
70 (2010), 75-104. 
 
  
The relative academic neglect of Conservative grassroots organizations is 
explained by a confluence in the different traditions that might have taken an 
interest. The Conservative Party’s own concern was short-lived. The sheer scale 
of the post-war membership boom deeply impressed the party leadership. Its 
masses were pictured on Conservative publicity as a symbol of popular 
legitimacy, usually as the kind of vast but very orderly queue described in one 
MPs' boast that ‘standing three abreast’ Conservative members would stretch the 
500 miles ‘from Lands End through Birmingham to Berwick-on-Tweed’.5 
However, after the relative failure of their 1958 recruitment drive mass 
membership largely disappeared from Conservative propaganda. By the early 
1960s the party’s central office declared that they had no real information about 
the grassroots.6 Subsequent scholars appear to have believed the party’s claims 
that it never had much interest in, or a clear idea about, its own local 
organizations. They have consequently supposed that there are limited resources 
available for such a study.7 This compounded the pre-existing tendency of 
historians of the Conservative Party to focus more on its high politics.8 It also 
fed into a political science literature where mass membership was seen as a 
 
5 Bodleian Library Oxford [hereafter BLO], CCO 500/11/5 Statement by Rt. Hon Malcolm 
McCorquodale MP, 19 March 1953; For the image see for example Conservative Party, The 
Personal Touch (London, 1948). 
6 BLO CCO 4/8/257 Organisation Officer to Alan Jupp, 1 November 1958; Personnel Officer to 
Ruth Dvorkin 10 August 1961. 
7 See for example Paul Whiteley, Patrick Seyd and Jeremy Richardson, True Blues: The Politics 
of Conservative Party Membership (Oxford, 1994), 20–1. 
8 See for example Robert Blake, The Conservative Party from Peel to Thatcher (London, 1985). 
John Ramsden’s work provides a partial exception but even here grassroots activity is frequently 
is not fully developed. See for example John Ramsden, The Age of Churchill and Eden, 1940–
1957 (Harlow, 1995). 
 
  
distinctive characteristic of the left; as Maurice Duverger argued, Conservatives 
might ‘make a show of recruiting’ but this was ‘not to be taken seriously’.9 
Those taking grassroots and local political history as their starting point offered 
little correction, not least because this tradition emerged from the political left 
and had a specific interest in the study of radical movements.10 Taken together 
then the preoccupations of political scientists, historians of the Conservative 
Party and those advocating a grassroots approach combined with problems of 
sources and the declining focus on its membership by the Party itself have 
militated against the kind of serious consideration of Conservative grassroots 
organizations in their own terms found in the analysis of other political parties.  
 
What literature there is on the party’s associations and membership in the early 
post-1945 years then comes predominantly from the top-down perspectives of 
national politics and the party centre. Perhaps most obviously, Conservative 
associations feature in debates about increasing apathy. On one side of these 
discussions the appearance is usually a simple presentation of peaking and then 
declining party membership figures which are taken to establish a decreasing 
participation in the formal aspects of British politics.11 Opponents of this view 
 
9 Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State 
(London, 1954), 64–6. 
10 For recent examples see Matthew Worley (ed.) Labour’s Grass Roots Essays on the Activities 
of Local Labour Parties and Members, 1918–1945 (London, 2005); We thus know more about 
the grassroots not just of the Labour Party but also of minor parties than we do we about the 
Conservatives see for example Thomas Linehan, East London For Mosley (London, 1996); 
Kevin Morgan, Gidon Cohen and Andrew Flinn, Communists and British Society, 1920-1991 
(London, 2007); Andrew Thorpe, “The Membership of the Communist Party of Great Britain”, 
Historical Journal, 43:3 (2000): 777–800. 
11 For a high profile recent example see Power Inquiry, Power to the People (York, 2006). 
 
  
complain that this establishes a mythic ‘golden age’ of participation based on 
national membership figures when not only were figures often exaggerated but 
also larger memberships reflected the organizational imperatives of the parties 
more than a genuine outpouring of popular enthusiasm.12 Alongside these 
debates run three more images that have appeared respectively in discussions 
about the distribution of power within British political parties, electoral 
organization and the place of women in politics.  
 
In the first of these, about the location of power within parties, the analysis has 
focused on constituency association ‘autonomy’. Autonomy here relates to the 
formal rights of Associations to select their own election candidates and officers 
and employ their own Agents and staff. In his seminal study of British political 
parties, Robert McKenzie implied that autonomy was of limited importance 
post-1945. Arguing that Associations were subservient to the will of the party 
centre, McKenzie claimed that it would ’be difficult to imagine a more tight-knit 
system of oligarchical control of the affairs of a political party’.13 The central 
point, reiterated by other authors, is that freedom only matters if exercised. 
Consequently, where there is fundamental agreement on values and widespread 
loyalty to the centre, formal autonomy is of very limited importance.14 
Conversely, those arguing for the importance of constituency autonomy have 
 
12 Susan Scarrow, Parties and their Members (Oxford, 1996) 186–7; cf. Steven Fielding, 
‘Activists against “Affluence”: Labour Party Culture during the “Golden Age,” circa 1950-
1970’, Journal of British Studies, 40:2 (2001), pp. 241-67 for this argument with respect to 
Labour Party membership. 
13 McKenzie, British Political Parties, 291, 241–259. 
14 Zig Layton-Henry, “Constituency Autonomy in the Conservative Party”, Parliamentary 
Affairs, 29:4 (1976): 401–402. 
 
  
stressed the absence of mechanisms of direct control from the party’s central 
and regional offices to the Associations.15 Furthermore, they have pointed out 
that local activists did not generally desire the jobs that Central Office could 
offer, and that funding flowed more from the constituencies to the centre than 
the other way round.16 They have also identified specific cases, particularly the 
deployment of working-class candidates in winnable seats, where constituency 
autonomy thwarted central office plans.17 Much of historians’ work on 
Conservative Associations has tended to agree with those emphasizing the 
importance of constituencies’ independence to their conduct.18 Overall, both 
sides in fact agree that that there is autonomy in the sense that each Association 
possesses a set of formal rights. They disagree about whether this autonomy had 
any significant impact on the distribution of power. For the argument of this 
article, the definition of autonomy is as important as the disagreement about its 
significance for the distribution of power.  
 
A further related characterization concerns the place of political thought, or 
rather the absence of it, in the study of local Conservatism. In contrast to 
Constituency Labour Parties, the local Conservative Association is often 
depicted as a simple social club, bound together more by personal ties than 
 
15 David Wilson, “Constituency Party Autonomy and Central Control”, Political Studies, 21:2 
(1973): 10. 
16 Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, “Central Office and ‘Power’ in the Conservative Party”, Political 
Studies, 20:1 (1972): 8.   
17 John Greenwood, “Promoting Working-Class Candidature in the Conservative Party: The 
Limits of Central Office Power”, Parliamentary Affairs, 414:4 (1988): 456–468. 
18 See for example Stuart Ball, “Local Conservatism and the Evolution of the Party 
Organisation” in Conservative Century: The Conservative Party Since 1900 ed. Anthony Seldon 
and Stuart Ball (Oxford, 1994), 261–311. 
 
  
ideas, whose only significant act is to get out the vote.19 Balfour's famous 
comment that he would sooner take advice from his valet, or to put the point 
more generally, the formal separation of the policy-making functions from the 
constituency associations, is often presented as a straightforward explanation of 
why ideological debate plays almost no role in their affairs.20 This image has 
been frequently questioned in the study of the Conservative Party’s ideological 
trajectory. The importance of the ideological dimension of local Associations 
has been stressed in studies across the twentieth century from the tariff reform 
policy of the early part of the century, through the clash between leadership 
pragmatism and grassroots idealism over protectionism in the interwar period to 
post-war debates surrounding immigration, Europe and economic policy.21 
Nevertheless, the apolitical image persists and recent scholarship of historians 
and political scientists has approached grassroots Conservatism only asking how 
much difference did campaigning make to getting out the vote.22 This focus is 
 
19 Duverger, Political Parties, 90–1; There is an extensive literature on political ideas and 
Constituency Labour Parties see for example Ben Pimlott, Labour and the Left in the 1930s 
(Cambridge, 1977), 111–140; Sue Goss, Local Labour and Local Government: A Study of 
Changing Interests, Politics and Policy in Southwark from 1919 to 1982 (Edinburgh, 1988). 
20 McKenzie, British Political Parties, 241–259. 
21 E.H.H. Green, The Crisis of Conservatism: The politics, economics and ideology of the British 
Conservative party, 1880-1914 (London, 1995); Stuart Ball, Baldwin and the Conservative 
Party: The crisis of 1929-1931 (New Haven, 1988); Nick Crowson, The Conservative Party and 
European Integration since 1945 (Abingdon, 2007) and “Conservative Party Activists and 
Immigration Policy from the Late 1940s to the Mid-1970s”, Mass Conservatism: The 
Conservatives and the Public since the 1880s in ed. Stuart Ball and Ian Holliday (London, 
2002); E.H.H. Green, Ideologies of Conservatism: Conservative politics ideas in the twentieth 
century (Oxford, 2002). 
22 This approach underpins the discussions of constituency campaigning in the Nuffield General 
Election studies. For a recent example from the historical literature, see Janet Johnson, “Did 
 
  
bolstered by the idea that the value of loyalty to the centre overrides other 
considerations, making independent ideological assessment of grassroots 
politics both unnecessary and unimportant.23 The result is a literature on 
Conservative Associations that is primarily concerned with their mundane, 
routine and hence depoliticized functions as a vote-mobilizing machine. This 
perspective seems validated by the top-down approach of many amongst the 
party leadership who regard this as the only significance of the party’s 
grassroots.  
 
Indeed, the absence of concern with policy and politics in Conservative 
Associations has been deployed to explain perhaps the most commented on 
feature of grassroots Conservative life, its gender composition.24 The ‘gender 
gap’ famously involved not just greater female than male electoral support for 
the Conservatives but also the numerical predominance of women amongst 
party members. The conventional explanation of why there were so many 
female Conservative Party members rests precisely on the absence of politics 
from associational life in general and women’s activity in particular, stressing 
the dominance of men in decision-making, and suggest that the party largely 
ignored women except in so far as they were expected to do all of the menial 
 
Organisation Really Matter? Party Organisation and Conservative Electoral Recovery, 1945-
59”, Twentieth Century British History, 14:4 (2003): 391–412. 
23 David Wilson, “Constituency Party Autonomy and Central Control”, Political Studies, 21:2 
(1973): 10. 
24 Joni Lovenduski, Pippa Norris and Catriona Burness, “The Party and Women”, in 
Conservative Century, ed. Seldon and Ball, 617–25. 
 
  
work with scant reward.25 However, the resulting social focus of female 
activism in the Conservative Party can be contrasted to the more political and 
macho environment of the Labour Party resulting in the suggestion that 
depoliticisation itself made the Conservative Party conducive to women’s 
participation; the Party was ‘more feminine’ and hence more attractive to 
women than the Labour Party.26 Again this image has been challenged. Some 
recent work has stressed the distinctive values of female Conservative 
membership rooted in middle-class ideas of local social leadership, suggesting 
that sustaining a perception of a right to rule involved taking personal 
responsibility and delivering public services.27 Further, commenting on the 
interwar period scholars have suggested that the contrast between the macho-
political Labour Party and the apolitical Conservative Association has been 
overblown. Indeed, David Jarvis has suggested that female political involvement 
was precisely one such area of contention, pointing to the extensive and widely 
voiced concerns within the Conservative Party about the ‘feminization’ of 
politics, with women invading male spaces and removing the ‘masculine’ 
emphasis on sharp conflict and argument from party politics.28 Following on 
from these critiques an alternative political explanation of the gender gap has 
been proposed to the conventional social explanation. This argues that female 
 
25 G.E. Maguire, Conservative Women: A History of Women and the Conservative Party, 1874–
1997 (Basingstoke, 1998), 140–144. 
26 Maguire, Conservative Women,  202–206. 
27 James Hinton, “Conservative Women and Voluntary Social Services, 1938-51”, in Mass 
Conservatism, ed. Ball and Holliday. 
28 David Jarvis, “The Conservative Party and the Politics of Gender, 1900-1939”, in The 




support was rooted the contrast between the Conservative Party success, and the 
Labour Party’s failure, to offer policies which were distinctive and attractive to 
women, not just the removal of rationing and other austerity measures, but also 
crucially the offer of workplace equality. The gender gap in this political view is 
thus based in the Conservative presentation of ‘equality for women as workers 
and citizens’.29 
 
Each of these debates has at its core a disputed image of the Conservative 
Association. There are thus four images which the article seeks to examine. 
First, the vast numbers of members and activists create a picture of extensive 
and commendable engagement with formal politics which can be contrasted 
with a contemporary and lamentable disengagement. Second, the power of 
Associations is understood through consideration of the formal set of rights that 
constitute constituency autonomy. Third, Associations appear as relatively 
depoliticized, giving sole focus to the campaigning functions valued by the party 
nationally. Finally, this depoliticized nature is one of the main reasons why 
women have been attracted to the party. Through the prism of the disputed 
environments of first North and then West Newcastle constituency Conservative 
Associations we offer a reinterpretation of each of these images, which 
questions both sides in these debates, to suggest that beginning from the 
 
29 Ina Zweiniger-Bargielowska, “Explaining the Gender Gap: The Conservative Party and the 
Women’s Vote, 1945-1964”, in The Conservatives and British Society, 1880-1990 ed. Martin 
Francis and Ina Zweiniger-Bargielowska (Cardiff, 1996), 215-6. For an explicit contrast which 
sets out Labour’s difficulties in this regard see Amy Black and Stephen Brooke, ‘The Labour 




grassroots offers an alternative perspective with which to more fruitfully study 
the dynamics operating at the local level. 
 
The Context of Conservative Politics in Newcastle 
 
The Conservative's Northern Area was the least favourable of any in England 
for the party.30 At parliamentary level there were remarkably few decent 
prospects, even in the rural boundaries of the area and Newcastle North, home 
not just to what the party described as ‘decent wage earners’ but also to most of 
the city’s wealthy industrialists, was the only safe urban seat.31 This scarcity 
made Newcastle North particularly desirable for aspiring Conservatives, but the 
party had broader electoral aspirations in the city extending to two of the other 
three Newcastle constituencies. The Conservatives had aims to win Newcastle 
West, although these were admittedly damaged by the 1948 redistribution which 
saw the solid Conservative area of Arthur’s Hill transferred to North in 
exchange for the marginal Kenton ward whilst the two ‘slum areas’ of Benwell 
and Scotswood remained.32 The party actually held the East Newcastle seat from 
1959-64. Only Central Newcastle was an overwhelming Labour stronghold.  
 
The city council presented another major arena of electoral opportunity. There 
was intense competition between the Labour Party, who briefly obtained a 
majority in 1945, and the Conservative dominated Progressive Party who were 
returned to power in 1949 and retained this until 1958. There were of course 
 
30 For a description of the changing boundaries of Conservative area organisation see David 
Wilson, Power and Party Bureaucracy in Britain (Farnborough, 1975), 17-29. 
31 Bodleian Library Oxford [hereafter BLO], 1/7/71 Newcastle North Basic Report 1949. 
32 BLO CCO/1/11/72 Newcastle West Basic Report, 13 July 1949. 
 
  
important differences between the Labour and Progressive approaches to 
running the city centred on the nature and purpose of planning, although not 
perhaps on the scale later suggested after the tenure of T. Dan Smith, the 
(in)famous Labour council leader from 1960-5 subsequently imprisoned for 
corruption.33 However, there were also important differences between 
Conservatives about the Progressive Party itself. In response to the 1945 
election defeat the Conservative Party nationally made the decision that the 
party label should invariably be used in local government.34 This advice, which 
seemed to those opposed to it to be about much more than a simple label, was 
divisive across the region, and nowhere more so than in Newcastle.35 Supporters 
of the Progressive Party saw local government as a realm for civic minded local 
people of distinction, whether Liberal, Conservative or independent, to offer 
their services to the community. Labour’s partisan approach to local politics was 
to be deplored not emulated. It was, therefore, crucial, as the Progressive Party 
stressed in its publicity that they would ‘develop the City by encouraging its 
trade, housing its people, and beautifying its surroundings in accordance with 
the needs and desires of its citizens, without regard to Political or sectional 
interests’.36 At the same time the desire to follow the national lead with respect 
 
33 T. Dan Smith, ‘Local Government in Newcastle upon Tyne: The background to some recent 
developments’, Public Administration, 43:4 (1965), pp. 413-418; David Byrne, “The 
Reconstruction of Newcastle: Planning since 1945”, in Newcastle upon Tyne: A Modern History 
ed. Robert Colls and Bill Lancaster (Shopwyke, 2001), 242-4; John Pendlebury, ‘Alas Smith and 
Burns? Conservation in Newcastle upon Tyne city centre 1959-68’, Planning Perspectives, 16: 2 
(2001), 115-141. 
34 John Ramsden, The Age of Churchill and Eden, 1940-1957, 206. 
35 Northumberland Record Office [hereafter NRO], 4137/2 General Purposes of the Northern 
Counties Provincial Area Minute Book, 24 March 1949; 20 October 1952. 
36 Progressive Party of Newcastle City Council advert, Evening Chronicle, 11 May 1949. 
 
  
to labelling provided only part of the motivation for Conservative opponents of 
the Progressives. This was accompanied by the view that the narrow culture of 
Progressive politics based in personal connections amongst and elite, was far too 
bound up with council dealings and a local government environment which was 
‘sordid, to say the least’.37  
 
Newcastle North Dispute 
 
The dispute in North Newcastle was certainly the most acrimonious in any 
Conservative Association of its time and indeed quite probably it was the most 
fractious in the twentieth century Conservative Party. It lasted longer that that 
the arguments in either St. Marylebone, 1932-45 or Winchester, 1990-2, the 
other potential nominees for this dubious honour.38 The arguments centred on 
the parliamentary nomination for the safest Conservative seat in the Northern 
Area, emerging into the open in 1940 with Sir Cuthbert Headlam’s objections to 
the sitting MP’s attempt to pass the seat on to his son, extending through and 
beyond repeated attempts to unseat Headlam and only really ending when the 
old-guard was removed from its last bastion of power with the end of 
Conservative support for the ‘Progressive Party’ after it lost control of 
Newcastle City council in 1958. As described below, throughout this time the 
party was in more or less open civil war; it split twice, was disaffiliated from the 
National Union and had the threat or actuality of rival Conservative candidates 
standing against each other in parliamentary elections.  
 
 
37 BLO CCO 1/11/69 Newcastle West Basic Report, 28 May 1956. 
38 Ball, ‘Local Conservatism’, 269. 
 
  
Tensions were already present in Newcastle North in 1940, when Nicholas 
Grattan-Doyle, its rather obscure backbench MP, decided to stand down due to 
ill-health. Grattan-Doyle had frustrated many within the Association and 
angered those outside it by maintaining control of the Association through the 
appointment of a small clique that kept their distance from the party’s Area 
organisation.39 As a final flourish, on retirement he influenced the executive to 
select his son Howard, a thirty-two year old Barrister, as candidate in a process 
which appeared as a kind of feudal succession that by-passed the Area 
organisation and gave scant consideration to the national organisation’s 
proposed candidates. Amongst the most agitated was Sir Cuthbert Headlam, the 
former MP for Barnard Castle, the Northern Area chairman and PPC for what he 
saw as the less desirable seat of Berwick. After Headlam failed to get the North 
Association to revoke the younger Grattan-Doyle’s selection he decided to stand 
against him. This first split in the Association saw Headlam and his band of 
supporters pull together a decent sized rival Conservative Association, 
numbering about 600, in the two weeks before the election.40 With neither 
 
39 For Grattan-Doyle see Richard Treadwell, Speculators and Patriots. Essays in Business 
Biography (London: Frank Cass, 1986), pp.102–3; Donald Macraild, Faith, Fraternity and 
Fighting. The Orange Order and Irish Migrants in Northern England (Liverpool, 2005), 271; 
Lewis H. Mates, ‘The United Front and the Popular Front in the North East of England 1936-
1939’ (Ph.D. thesis, Newcastle University, 2002), p.233.  
40 Headlam Diaries, Tuesday 2 April 1940 (p.184); Mass Observation Archive, University of 
Sussex [hereafter M-O A], TC 46/8/B, ‘The Newcastle North By-Election’, pp.10, 20; Headlam 
Diaries, Wednesday 22 May 1940 (p.200). 
 
  
candidate receiving official endorsement Headlam was elected on 6 June 1940 
by a large majority, but on a very low turnout.41 
 
Headlam was then admitted without difficulty into parliamentary party. Yet 
trouble remained at local level, which was removed from plain sight but not 
resolved by an uneasy and contested unification of the two associations in 
January 1941. The simmering tensions from the 1940 split evident throughout 
the war nearly boiled over in the run-up to the 1945 general election. As party 
politics re-emerged, Headlam’s opponents rallied behind the newly elected 
Association Chairman William Temple, a prominent member of Progressive 
Party. In June 1945, the Association executive adopted Temple rather than 
Headlam as its PPC. A lid was only kept on the dispute by the intervention of 
regional party grandee and Headlam’s friend Lord Matthew Ridley, which 
eventually saw the Association give a public display of overwhelming support 
for Headlam. Temple even agreed to propose Headlam as candidate.42   
 
After the 1945 election open hostilities resumed. Looking to the future, the 
ageing Headlam was desperate to ensure his successor was not among his local 
opponents and particularly not Temple. Headlam sought to achieve this by 
obtaining national support for an alternative. After exploring a range of 
possibilities, Headlam settled on the widely-backed suggestion of former 
Cabinet Minister Walter Elliott. Temple, however, resisted. Despite the 
 
41 Headlam won 7,380 votes to Grattan-Doyle’s 2,982. The turnout was 22% with other by-
elections in the surrounding months was in the 40-50% range T. Katrites, ‘British By-Elections 
in Wartime’, American Political Science Review, 36:3 (1942), 525-32. 
42 Headlam Diaries, Wednesday 19 February 1947; Tuesday 4 June 1945; Wednesday 4 July 
1945 (pp.461, 466, 488). 
 
  
intervention of national party chairman Lord Woolton, Temple refused even to 
refer the idea to the Association, insisting they needed a ‘local man’.43 Despite 
the constitutional irregularity of the chairman becoming candidate, Temple 
clearly thought himself just that person. At the same time the local party 
excluded Headlam from much of its activity and open attacks on him from the 
party Executive, Agent and Chairman became commonplace.44 The Association 
Executive again voted to deselect Headlam at an angry meeting in October 
1949, although the decision was overturned at an equally heated but much larger 
special general meeting, and then decisively by a vote of 704 to 201 at the 
Association AGM in January 1950.45 A comfortable victory for Headlam in the 
1950 General Election merely emphasised the ludicrous situation of warfare in 
the only Conservative stronghold in the region with increasing disquiet at the 
situation from across the Northern Area.46  
 
The second formal split in the Association came the following year, 
immediately after the AGM, another packed and rowdy affair. Temple painted 
himself as the victim claiming that he had ‘been literally persecuted for the last 
two years’ and condemning the ‘secret intrigue from minorities… to dictate the 
policy of the Association’.47 It became clear that Temple’s faction was actually 
increasing its support beyond the Executive. Indeed, with over 1,200 members 
 
43 BLO, CCO 1/7/71 Lord Woolton to Colonel Scanlan, 10 November 1949.  
44 BLO, CCO 1/8/71/1, Report of the Committee of Enquiry, 12 July 1951. 
45 Headlam Diaries, Thursday, 24 November 1949 (p.608); BLO, CCO 1/7/71, Galloway to T.F. 
Watson, 11 January 1950; Headlam Diaries, Tuesday 10 January 1950 (p.614). 
46 See for example the open letter to the Press from Conservative Candidates across the region 
Newcastle Journal, 20 April 1951. 
47 Newcastle Journal, 21 April 1951. 
 
  
voting, Headlam’s overwhelming support of the previous year had eroded to the 
point where his opponents secured a narrow victory. A Temple supporter 
defeated Headlam’s incumbent for the post of treasurer by 39 votes, while 
Temple himself was re-elected Chairman by a majority of 13. The seriousness of 
the divisions was exemplified in the battle for the post of President. Normally a 
titular position held uncontroversially by a person of prominence, Lord Ridley 
just managed to hold onto the post with a 12 vote majority.48 Disgusted with 
these results, Ridley declared himself unable to work with Temple and resigned 
immediately. Bizarrely, Temple declared to the Press there was 'no real split in 
the Association' and that 'free from external intervention, [he had] no doubt that 
the Association [would] continue to progress from strength to strength…’.49 
 
Temple’s public optimism was not borne out. Establishing rival Associations 
within a constituency was strongly discouraged by the Conservative Party.50 
Nevertheless, immediately after the AGM the pro-Headlam dissidents 
approached the National Union about setting up just such an organisation. On 8 
May 1951, led by Ridley, they formed a ‘New North Newcastle Conservative 
Association’.51 Strangely, Headlam equivocated in public for over a month 
before declaring his support for the new association because it was founded on 
‘sound and democratic lines calculated to prevent its control being secured by 
 
48 The votes were; President; Ridley 620 to J.C. Lawson’s 608; Chairman; Temple 622, to G.C. 
White’s 609 and Treasurer; Alridge 633 to Houston’s 594. BLO, CCO 1/8/71/1, Galloway to 
T.F. Watson, 23 April 1951.  
49 Evening Chronicle, 21 April 1951. 
50 BLO, CCO 1/8/71/1, T.F. Watson to General Director, 15 March 1951; Mr. Thomas to 
General Director, 25 April 1951 
51 BLO, CCO 1/8/71/1, Galloway to T.F. Watson, 9 May 1951. 
 
  
any kind of caucus’.52 Despite Headlam’s hesitation it grew rapidly, feeding 
from substantial resignations from the old which, in turn, denounced the new as 
undemocratic and unconstitutional.53 On 3 July 1951, only a few weeks after its 
formation, over 700 people attended the new Association’s first general 
meeting. By then it had raised several hundred pounds and had a membership of 
2,548 including 1,100 who had signed a resignation declaration from the old 
Association.54 
 
Although National and Area sympathies were clearly with the new Association, 
it received no formal support until it forced the issue by applying for affiliation 
to the party centre.55 The National Union then convened a Committee of 
Enquiry which considered a substantial body of evidence, the overwhelming 
majority of which was taken from representatives of the new Association. The 
evidence collected from the old Association consisted of just a brief claim of 
their democratic and constitutional legitimacy and a supporting petition of 
eighty-five office-holding Conservatives from surrounding constituencies.56 The 
Committee’s report found that there had been disloyalty to Headlam, inefficient 
administration, an unsatisfactory financial position, a failure to cooperate with 
the Area organisation and breaches of voting procedures. The report also 
 
52 Newcastle Journal, 18 June 1951. 
53 Headlam only declared his position on 19 June after he was called to make a statement of 
loyalty to the old Association, which led him to demand a declaration of loyalty to him which of 
course was not forthcoming see BLO, CCO 1/8/71/1, De Jonghe to T.F. Watson, 19 June 1951; 
Newcastle Journal, 18 June 1951; cf. DRO, D/He/133/18 Cuthbert Headlam Statement on the 
Dispute, 23 June 1951; DRO, D/He/133/19 North Newcastle 1940-1945. 
54 BLO, CCO 1/8/71/1, Galloway to T.F. Watson, 3 July 1951. 
55 BLO, CCO 1/8/71/1, The General Director to Galloway, 27 June 1951. 
56 BLO, CCO 1/8/71/1, ‘Petition Expressing Strong Disapproval of the Breakaway’. 
 
  
accepted that the general health of the new Association testified to the majority 
support it received in the constituency. It reiterated the general case against the 
formation of breakaway Associations, but in this particular case agreed that ‘the 
action was justified’ and not simply ‘because the personal antagonisms were 
deep and unrelenting’.57 Finding in favour of the new Association, the National 
Union accepted it and disaffiliated the old Association.  
 
The ‘old’ Association responded that it was ‘completely in the dark’ about the 
reasons for disaffiliation but remained ‘determined to carry on as usual’.58 It 
retained a substantial presence with a significant although diminished 
membership and control of one of the constituency’s two Conservative Clubs.59 
With Temple effectively out of the way Headlam decided to step down at the 
1951 election and the Association selected Gwilym Lloyd George, David’s son 
and technically a Liberal MP until 1950 and described in the local press as an 
‘outstanding national figure’, as its candidate.60 The old Association was not 
prepared to offer its support and fielded Colin Gray, chairman of the Wallsend 
Young Conservatives, as an Independent Conservative, although Lloyd George 
easily won with over 51% of the votes on an 85% turnout.  
 
Despite his removal from the Conservative Party Temple maintained an 
influence in the Progressive Party, which controlled Newcastle City Council. 
Throughout the 1950s the divisive debate about whether the party in Newcastle 
should stand under the Conservative label. When Lloyd George ended his 
 
57 BLO, CCO 1/8/71/1, Report of the Committee of Enquiry, 12 July 1951. 
58 Newcastle Journal, 20 July 1951. 
59 BLO, CCO 1/11/68, North Newcastle Basic Report, 28 May 1958. 
60 Newcastle Journal, 20 July 1951. 
 
  
ministerial career in 1957 and retired to the Lords, the resultant by-election 
prompted a ‘last hurrah’ from Temple and his followers. On 17 February 1957, 
the national office received a letter from Temple claiming, rather ironically, that 
the official candidate, William Elliott, was chosen in an unconstitutional 
manner. Temple asked for a meeting to discuss his (the old) Association’s 
preferred candidate.61 The old Association responded to the inevitable rebuff by 
formally adopting William McKeag, a Liberal and longstanding member of the 
Progressive Party, as its candidate on 25 February 1957.62 There followed 
feverish activity on both sides which eventually resulted in McKeag standing 
down, for fear for splitting the anti-Socialist vote.63 While Area officials still 
referred to ‘disgruntled Conservatives involved in the trouble in North 
Newcastle’ who were still on the council in March 1959, their days were 
numbered.64 With the loss of control of Newcastle City Council in 1958 the 
party finally made the move to stand as ‘Conservatives’, and from 1960 this was 
implemented across the whole city. With the removal of Temple’s last bastion of 
support the dispute which had dominated Newcastle Conservative politics for 
twenty years was finally at an end. 
 
Newcastle West Dispute 
 
The dispute in the neighbouring constituency of Newcastle West centred on the 
place of the Association’s women’s organisation named the Bentinck Women’s 
Committee. The dispute revolved around the Association’s attempts to bring the 
 
61 BLO, CCO 120/2/58, Oliver Poole to alderman Temple, 19 February 1957. 
62 The Times, 26 February 1957. 
63 BLO, CCO 120/2/58, S.H. Pierssené to the Party chairman, 18 February 1957. 
64 BLO, CCO 4/8/228, C.A.J. Norton Memo to the General Director, 19 March 1959.  
 
  
women’s organization under their control in line with national suggestions about 
Association structures. The women refused and disaffiliated from both the local 
association and the National Union, establishing a separate organisation which 
lasted from 1951 until 1966.  
 
Part of the problem was that the constitutional position of the Bentinck 
Women’s Committee had never been properly established. Established in the 
1930s, prior to 1948 the women in the Newcastle West Association had a single 
constituency level organisation named after street on which the headquarters 
were located. This comprised representatives from all the women’s ward 
organisations in the constituency, with Mrs. Claude Newman as Chairman from 
1946.65 In financial terms, the Association depended almost entirely on the 
Bentinck Committee’s work. Newman and other leading Bentinck figures 
regarded themselves as an autonomous unit on equal terms with, and certainly 
not responsible to, the constituency Association.66  
 
In the wake of the 1945 general election defeat, the Conservative Party 
embarked on a major reorganisation of its constituency Associations. 
Conservative headquarters advocated ‘fused Associations’ with joint branches 
for men and women, abolishing the old separate male and female branch 
structure. Although separate women’s sections were to continue (coordinated by 
a Women’s Advisory Committee), the aim was to integrate the women more 
 
65 Tyne and Wear Archives Service [hereafter TWAS], 1579/4, Newcastle West CCA Executive 
Council Minutes, 28 November 1946.  
66 TWAS, 1579/4, Newcastle West CCA Executive Council Minutes, 29 August 1946; 21 
September 1946; 5 June 1947; 5 December 1947; 7 June 1948; 5 July 1948; 14 April 1949; 
F&GPC Minutes, 28 April 1947 and 19 November 1947. 
 
  
fully into the Associations’ organisations.67 In Newcastle West local level 
changes imposed by the redistribution of constituency boundaries in 1948 
augmented these national pressures towards organisational change.68 In line with 
National Union model rules, Association officials proposed a revised 
constitution with a Women’s Advisory Committee composed of all female 
members of the Association’s Executive Council. This was to have no separate 
funds and no authority over ward or polling district committees. The 
constitution did retain the Bentinck committee, allowing it to draw members 
from all wards, hold propaganda meetings and raise funds, but it no longer had 
direct representation on important committees and in every formal respect it was 
clearly now constitutionally subordinate to the Association.69  
 
The Bentinck women saw the changes as a downgrading of their status. With the 
leading women attending the 1948 Conservative Party conference they had 
immediately objected to the proposed changes.70 They wanted their women’s 
branch to have the highest levels of ‘function and status’, autonomy (particularly 
in financial terms), and for it to coordinate and take credit for women’s work at 
ward level. They rejected compromises like a proposed women’s divisional 
 
67 BLO, CCO 4/2/138, ‘The Organisation of Women within the Party ([nd])’; Maguire, 
Conservative Women, p.140. 
68 TWAS, 1579/4, Newcastle West CCA Executive Council Minutes, 21 October 1948; 14 April 
1949; F&GPC Minutes, 5 October 1950.  
69 TWAS, 1579/4, Newcastle West CCA Executive Council Minutes, 14 September 1950; List 
of Organisations (including their roles and powers) within Newcastle West CCA, October 1950; 
BLO, CCO 1/8/72, Galloway Memo to T.F. Watson, 3 August 1951. 
70 TWAS, 1579/4, Newcastle West CCA Executive Council Minutes, 21 October 1948; BLO, 
CCO 1/8/72, Galloway Memo to T.F. Watson, 3 August 1951. 
 
  
committee with the power to convene an annual meeting.71 Their demands were 
repeatedly discussed at Executive Council meetings and rejected by increasingly 
large majorities with a particular insistence on the right of the Association as a 
whole, rather than the women alone, to decide on constitutional matters.  
 
As in North Newcastle the split came in 1951. At the AGM tensions simmered 
below the surface and there were veiled attacks on the women.72 Mrs. Newman, 
although remaining Chairman of the women’s Association, was beaten 
decisively in the ballot for vice-chairmanship of the Association by her rival 
Mrs. Graham of Kenton (brought into the constituency in 1948).73 Just three 
days after the AGM the Bentinck women declared their independence from the 
West Association, establishing themselves as the ‘Newcastle West Women’s 
Conservative and Unionist Association’ effective from 26 July 1951. They 
claimed to number several hundred and were certainly much larger than the 
West Association’s estimate of fifty presented to minimise the split.74  The new 
women’s Association presented this move as simply reverting ‘to our original 
organisation’ in order to retain a ‘separate identity’ and applied to the National 
 
71 TWAS, 1579/4, Newcastle West CCA Executive Council Minutes, 7 December 1950; 29 
March 1951; 28 June 1951; F&GPC Minutes, 11 June 1951. 
72 TWAS, 1579/4, Newcastle West CCA Executive Council Minutes, 28 June 1951; F&GPC 
Minutes, 9 July 1951. 
73 TWAS, 1579/1, Newcastle West CCA, 1951 AGM Minutes; BLO, CCO 1/8/72, Galloway 
Memo to T.F. Watson, 3 August 1951. 
74 Newcastle Journal, 4 August 1951. The women sent a copy of this letter to Galloway who 




Union for affiliation.75 The West Association responded that the women’s 
Association had never been separate, but rather always subject to the 
Association’s Executive.  
 
Despite initial prospects of reconciliation on both sides it was not long before 
the Bentinck women were using the press to launch public attacks on the West 
Association.76 There were also fierce disputes about finance including over the 
proprietorship of all the former women’s branches’ assets and especially the 
well-stocked building fund which had been accruing money since 1935.77 As 
William Temple had close connections with the West Association (having been 
a previous Chairman), informed speculators made the obvious links with the 
North Newcastle dispute.78 This connection made Area officials, in consultation 
with the National Union, even keener to facilitate reconciliation. The West 
 
75 Jack Galloway, the Area Agent, contradicted this in August 1951. BLO, CCO 1/8/72, 
Galloway Memo to T.F. Watson, 3 August 1951; De Jonghe Memo to Miss Fetcher, 30 August 
1951, appendix ‘B’. 
76 BLO, CCO 1/8/72, S.E. Atchison to chair of Newcastle West CCA, August 1951; TWAS, 
1579/4, Newcastle West CCA Special Executive Council Minutes, 22 August 1951; BLO, CCO 
1/8/72, De Jonghe Memo to Miss Fetcher, 30 August 1951, appendix ‘B’; TWAS, 1579/4, 
Newcastle West CCA Special Executive Council Minutes, 22 August 1951; Newcastle Journal, 
4 August 1951. 
77 BLO, CCO 1/8/72, De Jonghe Memo to Miss Fetcher, 30 August 1951; Galloway Memo to 
T.F. Watson, 3 August 1951; CCO 1/11/69, Newcastle West Basic Report, 28 May 1956; 
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Association leaders were prepared for the Area officials to arrange discussions 
with the women. However, the women, in line with their demands for 
autonomy, were not compliant. By October 1951, the women’s Association held 
that they and the West Association were two entirely separate bodies which, 
according to Newman, meant that there was no dispute between these two 
Associations; ‘all that exists is the offer of cooperation on the one side and non-
acceptance of this by the other side’.79 Area officials repeatedly challenged this 
rather idiosyncratic interpretation of what constituted a dispute, and at each 
point offered arbitration. The women continually refused, denying there was a 
dispute. Increasingly, however, they voiced suspicions about the impartiality of 
Area decisions, pointing to the closeness of ties between Area officials and West 
Association leaders. When Area officials firmly opposed national recognition of 
the women’s Association in February 1952, the women withdrew their 
application for affiliation to the National Union.80  
 
In March 1952 the West Association took control of the party premises at No.3 
Bentinck Villas and posted notices informing the Bentinck women that there 
could be no more whist drives or other functions held there other than those the 
Association managed for its direct benefit. The Area and National Unions 
reassured the West Association of its position, that the women’s Association 
would not be officially recognised nor would any financial assistance be taken 
from them. The West Executive then symbolically removed the balances of the 
Bentinck women's branch and the building fund, which had hitherto been carried 
 
79 NRO, 4137/2, Northern Area GPC Minutes, 30 October 1951. 
80 NRO, Northern Area GPC Minutes, 30 October 1951; 3 December 1951; 11 February 1952; 
TWAS, 1579/4, Newcastle West CCA Executive Council Minutes, 19 November 1951; 15 
January 1952.  
 
  
forward, from its accounts.81 Subsequently, both the West Association and the 
National Union decided not to concern themselves with the women’s 
organisation, refusing to reply to correspondence received.82 By 1956 the Area 
agent commented that ‘the atmosphere is much quieter now’ and the women’s 
Association seemed to be ‘developing into a card-playing Club’.83 The issue re-
surfaced only in December 1965 when the Association discussed at length the 
women’s Association’s disbandment.84 By April 1966, the women had sold their 
Club House to North Newcastle Association with ‘the proceeds distributed 
among the members of Mrs. Newman’s “organisation”’. Newman had ignored 
an Association letter asking for a meeting on this and the Association ‘agreed 
with reluctance to consider the matter closed’.85  
 
Images of Local Conservatism Revisited 
 
The situations in North and West Newcastle provide interesting test cases for the 
arguments about the supposed ‘golden age’ of party membership in the 
immediate post-war years. Broadly, the national pattern of increasing 
membership from 1945 to the early 1950s to levels that are out of all proportion 
with later periods was replicated in both Associations. The claimed 
memberships for 1946 of 1,000 in West and 1,388 in North would be very 
healthy by today’s standards, but occurred in organizations which had 
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83 BLO, CCO 1/11/69, Newcastle West Basic Report, 28 May 1956. 
84 TWAS, 1579/6, Newcastle West CCA, F&GPC Minutes, 14 December 1965. 
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disintegrated during the war. These levels were rapidly eclipsed with the 
Associations claiming membership of 4,500 and 3,784 respectively by 1951. Yet 
these normal patterns are of particular interest as they occurred in Associations 
where organization was the opposite of that desired by the Conservative Party. 
Indeed, the disputes themselves are not the only evidence of what might be 
regarded as negligent or inappropriate approaches to building a local 
Association’s strength.   Even in the mid-1950s the Newcastle West Association 
was singled out ‘by the marked absence of leaders of any quality’ with the 
longstanding Agent regarded as a disaster who was interested in ‘intrigue’ and 
getting her own way rather than developing the party.86 In Newcastle North the 
situation was even worse. The ‘old’ Association’s complete lack of interest in 
membership was a major plank of evidence deployed by Headlam’s supporters 
when securing the new Association’s recognition from the National Union.87 
Where the Association executive could not be sure of political support they 
blocked the formation of new branches, which would have brought in many new 
members. They even reprimanded those seeking to create the branches for 
taking ‘unwarranted action’ without consulting the ‘Senior branches of the 
Association’.88 In both constituencies then organization was appalling whilst 
patterns of membership growth were fairly normal. This combination provides 
prima facie evidence against one conventional view that post-war organizational 
efficiency explains the boost in membership.  
 
 
86 BLO, CCO 1/11/69, Newcastle West Basic Report, 28 May 1956. 
87 BLO, CCO 1/8/71/1, Statement by the Viscount Ridley. 
88 There were two branches blocked, one was a branch of the Young Conservatives the other a 
new women’s branch in Elswick war. BLO, CCO 1/8/71/1, Eric Snowdon Evidence to Enquiry. 
 
  
However, the contrary case that the growth in membership stemmed from an 
upsurge in popular interest in politics is not so easily established. A more 
detailed examination shows that membership levels were frequently inaccurate 
or exaggerated and that membership did respond to organizational imperatives 
as well as popular enthusiasm. The Newcastle West figures provide a decent 
example of both inaccuracy and exaggeration. That their public estimates were 
always rounded to the nearest hundred itself suggests a lack of accurate 
membership records but in their internal discussion the approximation is made 
explicit with overall figures sometimes spanning a range of 500.89 Furthermore, 
there is evidence of exaggeration for political reasons; In 1951 the public claim 
of 4,500 members was not only 1,000 greater than the estimate for internal 
consumption but was explicitly linked to a criticism of the Bentinck women 
with the claim that the ’growth could never have happened with the old separate 
men’s and women’s organizations’.90 
 
In Newcastle North more careful records of membership were kept, but this did 
not stop and the figures being manipulated in other ways. In particular, although 
there were rules about who could join and how they could participate, these 
were simply brushed aside when it suited. Most significantly, in 1951 Temple’s 
supporters signed up several hundred members on an unconstitutionally reduced 
rate of one shilling, encouraging them to vote at the AGM contrary to the rule 
requiring participants to have been members for at least a month.91 Even clearer 
 
89 TWAS, 1579/4, Newcastle West CCA Executive Council Minutes, 19 November 1951. 
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evidence that membership levels responded to the approach of the parties 
themselves can be found in the achievements of the New North Newcastle 
Association. When it focused on recruitment the New North Association 
achieved a membership of 5,358 by 1952, more than 1,500 greater than the 
maximum reached by the old Association in the previous year.92 North 
Newcastle had amongst the best attended annual general meetings of any 
constituency Association in the country; over 1,200 in 1951, about one third of 
the Association’s membership. Accounting for this is equally complex. There 
were claims that people were cajoled to attend meetings, and many were present 
to watch a good fight rather than to participate in democratic deliberation. Once 
the dispute was settled in the late 1950s, meeting attendances settled down to 
more usual levels of about 100-150, indicating that factionalism was clearly a 
spur to attendance.93  
 
These points call some of the figures into question and indicate an importance 
for the Associations’ activities in recruiting members and activists. However, 
they do not show that there was no upsurge in popular support for the 
Conservative Party. The membership figures given, whilst far from perfect 
indicators of support, and in need of critical reading, nevertheless remain useful. 
The short-term illicit practices in North Newcastle had only a limited effect on 
membership levels; the net increase over the year was less than 100 individuals. 
Even in inauspicious circumstances recruitment of new members appeared 
 
the reduced rate (and even then the majority was contested. BLO CCO 1/8/71/1 Statement by 
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relatively easy. When the North Association split in 1940 the mass observation 
records indicate that most voters believed there was nothing much at stake 
between Headlam and Grattan-Doyle and the war was a much more pressing 
concern to most people. Still, in the space of a couple of weeks, the new 
Association not only put together a decent campaigning organization but, 
according to independent accounts, it recruited about 600 members.94 
 
In Newcastle West whilst the figures are clearly approximations and significant 
weight cannot be placed on detailed claims about increases or decreases in 
membership, it would be wrong to dismiss them completely. In West Newcastle 
membership figures were not only presented to the public in annual reports but 
were also identified internally as an important indicator of success and failure.95 
The internal figures were at least informed guesses; some wards did keep careful 
membership lists and the breakdown of membership at ward level suggests that 
the overall numbers offered were not massively over inflated.96 
 
Thus, taken together the cases have two implications for the debate about a 
‘golden age’ of participation. First, there is an obvious but important point that 
the evidence in support of both sides suggests that these arguments have been 
framed in a way which is too simplistic. Probing the accuracy of membership 
data and arguing that party organization contributed to increases in membership 
is perfectly consistent with the view that there was a higher level of popular 
interest in parties in the 1940s and 1950s than seen subsequently. Crudely, 
 
94 M-O A, TC 46/8/B, ‘The Newcastle North By-Election’, p. 21. 
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concerted efforts could recruit hundreds of members and dozens of new activists 
in a single day in the 1940s and 1950s. This is best explained by both 
organizational imperatives on membership (which is why there was a campaign 
in the first place) and a public who were receptive to these approaches (which is 
why those approached were happy to join and become active).  
 
Second, and perhaps less evidently, the cases suggest that the meaning of 
political activity as well as its quantity needs more careful investigation. 
Although there were large numbers of participants, their motivations were much 
more varied than usually supposed. The reasons for the high levels of activism 
in our cases tell against roseate ‘golden age’ assumptions and included activists 
treating politics, and the open disputes associated with it, as a public spectacle 
much more than as a careful and deliberative process. Clearly, given the unusual 
nature of the situations in these Associations, we do not suggest that such 
features explain generally high levels of membership and activism seen in the 
1950s. Rather the point is that the picture of the golden age moves too quickly 
from observing quantities of membership and activism without also being 
attentive to what those joining parties and attending meetings were actually 
doing and why.  
 
The cases also enable us to examine debates about the place of women within 
the Conservative Party. Conventional explanations of the predominance of 
women within the Conservative Party rest on the conjunction of two claims. 
First, that women tended to be in the majority but whose routine work had a 
‘social’ focus at some distance from the core ‘political’ work and local centres 
of power. Second, that the Conservative Party is non-ideological, with disputes 
based on personality rather than conflicts of ideas. Taking these two points 
 
  
together it is claimed that ‘depoliticisation’ -the social, consensual and generally 
apolitical nature of Conservative Associations - explains the high levels of 
female involvement. The alternative, political explanation, suggests instead that 
women’s activity was motivated specifically by policy stances in line with 
gender equality such as the Conservative attitude towards equal pay. 
 
A surface reading of the Newcastle cases might appear to provide support for 
the conventional, and against the political, view. Women did comprise a 
majority of the membership in both Associations and certainly did do the bulk of 
the routine, organizational work. Much of their activity involved organizing 
jumble sales, whist drives and the like. Indeed, after disaffiliation the separate 
women’s organization in Newcastle West was described as just another card-
playing club. Equally, in both North and West personality and manoeuvring for 
control present themselves as more obvious features than ideology. Certainly, 
the disputes seem very different from those often found in local Labour parties, 
where clearly defined political programs sometimes associated with rival 
political parties or factions clashed. 
 
However, a more careful examination of the cases shows that this interpretation 
is seriously misleading. In part the mistake is to imagine that ideological 
disputes will present themselves in the same ways in different parties. In the 
Labour Party it was often more respectable to present a personality conflict or a 
bid for power in ideological clothing. In the Conservative Party the opposite was 
usually true; the ideological content was in need of hiding. On closer inspection 
it is perhaps not surprising that important or even central aspects of both 
disputes were battles of ideas. Thus, Headlam was not simply promoting his 
own return to parliament. He took steps that would otherwise have been 
 
  
unthinkable for him because he opposed what he saw as nepotism in the modern 
Conservative Party. Similarly, the old North Association was not just advancing 
Temple’s personal fortunes but was tied into support for the progressive 
approach to municipal politics in Newcastle. This stressed the importance of 
leadership from individuals of experience and standing aside from ‘politics’ in 
local government and implied a close relationship with local Liberals. 
 
However, more importantly the account given of what attracted women the 
party is mistaken. Indeed, the whole idea that the women’s branches did not in 
general have power within Conservative Associations is misleading. The 
conflict in West Newcastle involved a very self-confident group of women who 
above all desired recognition that they were not subservient to the main 
association which, as it happened, was male dominated. That this manifested 
itself in open dispute and disaffiliation was unusual, but the mechanisms that it 
lays bare are not. The separate Conservative women’s structures (when the 
absence of equivalents was a source of long-running battles within the Labour 
Party), were an important source of power. Further, the power and self-
confidence of women in the Party was not in tension with their social and 
financial activity, but rather depended upon it to a significant degree. The 
substantial funds they raised were central to the smooth operation of the 
Association and consequently gave the women who controlled them significant 
influence.  
 
All sides in these disputes made great efforts to call specifically for female 
support. In Newcastle North for example, Temple appealed to the women 
claiming that only he was prepared to allow them to manage their own affairs. 
At the same time Headlam’s supporters claimed that Temple blocked the 
 
  
formation of a new women’s branch that he was not certain he could control.97 
Women were the object of such regular appeals for support because their 
activity sustained the Associations. The cases tell strongly against the view that 
the ‘feminine’, non-ideological and consensual nature of the Conservative Party 
attracted women.  However, rather than endorsing the alternative political 
explanations, the suggestion is that the separation between the political and 
social sides of party life is artificial and diverts attention from the diverse 
expressions of political self-confidence by Conservative women.  
 
The two case studies also throw light on ‘autonomy’; the right of the local ‘us’ 
to refuse the unwanted interference of the outside ‘others’. Conventional 
accounts of autonomy are confined to the formal inability of Head Office or its 
Area Agents to require action on candidates or staffing by Associations. 
Certainly, this was evident in both disputes. Indeed, Conservative Central Office 
thought the disputes demonstrated that autonomy had gone too far and that the 
Area needed to get involved at an earlier stage. Yet, Area officials had become 
involved in both disputes and in both cases, the Area Agents had clear views 
about how the dispute could (and should) be settled. However, Area official 
removed themselves from intervention because without formal powers their 
participation seemed likely to inflame the situation. Area involvement in North 
Newcastle is particularly noteworthy because whilst all kinds of minor spats 
were formally discussed by the Area committees mention of this most 
damaging, public and acrimonious dispute is conspicuous by its absence. Whilst 
in private correspondence the efforts of Area officials to resolve matters are 
evident, in public all the Area ever said was that the Association alone had the 
 
97 Newcastle Journal, 20 April 1951; BLO, CCO 1/8/71/1, Eric Snowdon Evidence to Enquiry. 
 
  
right to decide matters.98 So careful were the minute takers to avoid the 
appearance of taking sides that even in discussions where it must have been 
central minimal traces were left of a connection back to North Newcastle.99 
When it came to Newcastle West, Area level officials repeatedly offered to 
arbitrate.100 When the women refused the offers, alleging bias at Area level, 
refused the offer Area officials took the matter no further realising that in part it 
was discussion of the dispute at Area level which was fuelling the women’s 
suspicions.101 One consequence of autonomy was that the Area officials could 
be viewed as outsiders rather than neutral arbiters in disputes. Viewed in this 
way, the constraints that constituency autonomy imposed on central control 
demonstrate that the party is not best characterized solely by central control.  
 
The cases illustrate two further points about autonomy. First, the formal 
relationships identified in the conventional understanding of autonomy do not 
provide an adequate account of the location of power within the party. This can 
be illustrated by considering the position of the Area Agents’, whose roles 
including acting as the eyes and ears of the Central Office on the ground. A key 
task was to build up relationships in the constituencies they covered. Area 
Agents knew individuals they could trust in each of the Associations. When 
there were insufficient trustworthy activists the Agents, or those they trusted, 
attempted to involve such figures (even if, as in the case of Lord Matthew 
 
98 NRO, 4137/2, Northern Area GPC Minutes, 8 November 1949. 
99 They used general formulae, making thinly veiled references to ‘disputes in other 
constituencies’ but not even mentioning specific constituencies. See for example NRO, 4132/2, 
Northern Area GPC Minutes, 30 October 1951. 
100 NRO, 4137/2, Northern Area GPC Minutes, 14 January 1952. 
101 NRO, 4137/2, Northern Area GPC Minutes, 5 May 1952. 
 
  
Ridley, this meant drafting in a local Conservative grandee). At the same time, 
for constituency level activists, support within the Area or national levels of the 
party was a significant resource that could be utilized to destabilize opponents 
and achieve desired ends. The Area Agents gave the national view of local 
situations and their interpretations of disputes were readily accepted at Central 
Office. Mrs. Newman frequently complained that Area was hostile to the West 
women because of the presence of the West Association chairman at Area 
meetings. She was in fact wrong about the details of who attended specific 
meetings but the close relationship between Area officials and the West 
Association chairman means that her concerns were almost certainly justified. 
Even more clearly, when William Temple appealed directly to the National 
Union he was given short shrift, not just because the Area level dealt with such 
matters but more importantly because the Area Agent’s assessment had 
determined Central Office’s understanding of the dispute. The biases of the 
enquiry in North Newcastle, particularly evident in the scanty evidence collected 
on Temple’s side, were a consequence of a decision effectively agreed in 
advance between the National Union and the Area Agent. If the centre could not 
control decisions at constituency level, the hand of Association activists was 
unquestionably strengthened if they were able to call upon the support of higher-
level contacts. When considering the location of power within the party from the 
bottom-up it is particularly evident that many of the most important connections 
in both directions were informal. 
 
Second, considerations about the location of power do not exhaust the 
importance of autonomy. Rather autonomy should be understood as possessing 
normative value for party activists. Agreement about the importance of 
autonomy stemmed from the similarity of the basic idea of local independence 
 
  
to contemporary Conservative understandings of freedom, which stressed the 
non-interference of the political centre. The broad agreement that Association 
autonomy was important was demonstrated by the place that the idea of local 
independence played in the disputes. In Newcastle West, all sides argued that 
autonomy was a principle underpinning the rewriting of the constitution, with 
the central question being who or what possessed it.  On one side, the answer 
was that the Association as a whole, led by its Executive, possessed the right of 
self-government. A part of this vision implied that no constituent section of the 
Association could be completely free to organize itself, independent of the rest. 
On the other side, the services the Newcastle West women provided to the 
Association entitled them to autonomy, and the related status, on a level 
equivalent to the Association as a whole. In North Newcastle too, arguments on 
all sides were repeatedly cast in terms of freedom from outside interference. 
Grattan-Doyle presented Headlam as an invading domestic Hitler, stressing his 
receipt of aid from outside the constituency.102 Temple emphasized not just the 
right of the Association Executive to select its own candidate, but also to select a 
local man. He also claimed the right of an Association to effectively deselect 
their MP, and certainly to prevent the MP from working against the wishes of 
the Association to develop a power base. Arguments from Headlam’s side 
presented the rights claimed by Grattan-Doyle and Temple as narrow and self-
serving and as the power of a sitting MP to pass the seat to his son and, later, of 
a party chairman to claim the seat for himself. The exercise of such powers was 
inimical to ‘modern’ Conservative values of constitutionality, fairness and 
democracy. However, the power of the idea of autonomy is reinforced because 
 
102 ‘Facts You Ought to Know’, NNCA, cited in M-O A, TC 46/8/B, p.8 and Nicholas Grattan-
Doyle, ‘Farewell to the Electorate’ cited in M-O A, TC 46/8/B, p.13 
 
  
Headlam and his followers did not present these arguments as being in 
opposition to autonomy, nor did they suggest the need for it to be pragmatically 
tempered. Rather they recast the terms of debate presenting a different vision of 
the ‘us’ with autonomy and the ‘them’ threatening it. Specifically, they attacked 
the domination of a small central clique over the wider Association. Headlam’s 
followers claimed the right of self-management for individual Conservatives in 
the constituency, thereby rejecting the Association’s Executive or leaders’ 
spurious claims for autonomy. Viewed from this perspective autonomy was 
much more than a formal result of National Union rules, it was an important, 
and contested, normative value that underpinned Association life.  
 
In summary, our analysis of the case studies suggests revision of traditional 
ways of looking at grassroots Conservatism. The conventional conception of 
autonomy as a formal relationship between Associations and the party centre is 
challenged first because it obscures the informal relationships between different 
levels and the central role that ideas of autonomy played in structuring these and 
second, because it overlooks how the idea functioned as a normative value so 
that debates about constitutional forms and even arguments against local 
variation from national norms had to take the idea of local autonomy as their 
starting point. The analysis also challenges conventional stereotypes; of the 
golden age of activism, where meanings of membership must be attended to 
alongside studies of quantity, and the nature of female participation, where both 
social and political motivations were central to shaping conduct. Taken together 
this suggests that the study of grassroots Conservatism needs to grapple with the 
meanings, motivations and practices as seen from below as well as the 
consequences of such activity for those above. In this way the study of politics 
 
  
from the bottom-up can have significant consequences for our understanding of 
the Conservative Party.  
 
